Introduction
Should an advocate of animalism instead endorse hylomorphism or would it be best for a hylomorphist to switch his support to animalism?
1 More precisely, are the considerations in favor of animalism more successfully met, and its drawbacks better avoided, by adopting a hylomorphic position, or does a Thomistic thinker have reasons to undergo a "metaphysical conversion" and emerge proselytizing for a Catholic animalism?
We'll look for answers by comparing the Angelic Doctor's account of personal identity to that of the Patron Saint of Animalism, Eric Olson. 2 Alas, the comparison will be incomplete due to the vast number of points of contention. Nevertheless, I hope to make some headway and provide some results that will be rather startling.
Animal Magnetism and Animal "Turn Offs"
What I find most appealing about animalism is that it avoids the Problem of Too Many Thinkers that plagues its psychological rivals. If there are spatially coincident persons and organisms, or persons embedded within organisms, the shared brain suggests too many thinkers. If the person can use it to think, why can't the animal? Thus there will be two thinkers where we would like just one. Olson draws our attention to a number of problems, the most interesting being an epistemic problem for the animal. Any reason the person had to think he was the person, so would the overlapping thinking animal sharing his thoughts. What Olson has not stressed is that commonsense morality is greatly 1 Someone might call both theories "animalism." I am not opposed to this but just stipulating for our purposes that animalism is the theory that we are essentially living animals and soulless.
3 undermined by the problem of too many thinkers. If human animals can't self-refer or don't know that they are referring to themselves with the first-person pronoun, then how can they be said to autonomously agree to any actions? One couldn't be autonomous if one could not reflect upon one's interests, desires and reasons as one's own. Since the autonomy literature often runs parallel to the free will literature, what makes autonomy impossible will, in many cases, also make free will impossible. Without free will there will not be moral responsibility and so our ethics will be turned upside down.
Let's now look at the "Turn Offs" of animalism. It is often pejoratively said of animalism that it understands us to be "mere animals" or "brute animals." The approach makes mental capacities irrelevant to our identity and persistence. What many take to ontologically distinguish us from other creatures, our being reasoners, moral agents, and knowers, are all contingent on the animalist account. Such assumptions result in animalism faring poorly with thought experiments such as the cerebrum transplant that are aimed to elicit our intuitions about what kind of being we are. The animalist needs to explain away the transplant intuition that our apparent prudential concern tracks identity and thus our concern for any future being with our cerebrum indicates a concern for our own future.
Olson draws upon the Parfit-inspired claim that fission scenarios show that identity is not what matters to us. Parfit holds that if only one of our cerebral hemispheres survived the removal procedure, we would identify with the recipient of that remaining hemisphere, just as we would identify in the absence of any fictional transplants with the maimed possessor of our reduced cerebrum after a stroke destroys one of the two hemispheres. But if both hemispheres are separated and successfully transplanted into 4 distinct bodies, it would be arbitrary to identify with the person possessing one of the hemispheres, hard to believe that one was a scattered being, and logically problematic to be identical to both cerebrum recipients if they were considered distinct persons. Thus the conclusion that we are not identical to either of them. However, we seem to care about our successors in much the same manner as we would about our own future self in the absence of fission. According to Parfit, the moral of such reactions to fission is that identity is not what matters to most of us. He insists that what we care about in normal cases of survival isn't that we persist but that our psychology does. We care about the being which in which the physical realization of our psychological capacities are found.
Olson draws upon this to argue that that the hypothetical transplant case without the fissioning of cerebral hemispheres should be understood as analogous to the fission case. Our concern for the being that receives the undivided cerebrum in a transplant
should not be interpreted as providing any more metaphysical insight into our identity than such concern did in the fission scenario. Practical questions about what matters to us and metaphysical questions whether we would survive some event need to be separated.
The answer to the first will not enlighten us about the latter.
I fail to share Parfit and Olson's intuitions about identity not mattering. 3 I want to survive into the future and find little comfort in a merely qualitatively identical replacement. Identity seems to be a precondition for much of what we value. Identity is not something only of derivative value due to one's being identical to the subject of the thoughts and feelings, the continuation of such mental states, regardless of who is their subject, being what really, nonderivatively matters. I think the attitude that identity really 5 does matter is very evident when contemplating one's young son or daughter splitting because concern for the well being of offspring is more clearly dependent upon their identity being preserved than their psychology continuing. We don't come to love our children in virtue of their psychology and we would continue to show the same great concern if they underwent radical psychological discontinuity. But if they cease to exist via fission, our concern won't transfer undiminished to their successors.
Moreover, I suspect that if the argument about identity not mattering is based on the famous fission scenario, then it is flawed for the reason Hawley gives: it leaves unexplained correlations between distinct existences. Moreover, one can't make the case that the mere cerebrum in a transplant scenario is a maimed animal for it lacks the integrative functions characteristic of an animal.
The hylomorphic tradition construes a human being to as a single substance resulting from a soul configuring matter. According to my construal of hylomorphism, the person's soul will configure less matter during the transplant procedure than it did before being the cerebrum was removed, and then will configure more and different matter after the cerebrum has been "replanted." In the interim period, the time which the cerebrum has been removed from one skull but not yet put in another, the person 8 becomes physically very small, just cerebrum-size. Instead of configuring the body of an animal, the rational soul configures merely the matter of the cerebrum.
To understand why the human animal on the hylomorphic construal behaves differently than does an organism -human or otherwise -on the animalist account, readers need to keep in mind the Thomistic claim that the human animal is a distinctive animal. This is why the human soul had to be imposed by God from the outside rather than emerges from appropriately configured matter as with the vegetative and sensitive souls. Aquinas thought no material organ could give rise to or be responsible for such What occurs with the removal of the cerebrum in the transplant thought experiment is basically the reverse. We can call it "departed hominization." Aquinas seems to defend departed hominization. He writes: "In the course of corruption, first the use of reason is lost, but living and breathing remain: then living and breathing go, but a being remains, since it is not corrupted into nothing…when human being is removed, animal is not removed as a consequence" 6 So claiming that substantial change has occurred upon the removal of the cerebrum doesn't involve any radical adjustment to the tenets of the traditional Thomistic hylomorphic theory. The advocate of Aquinas's metaphysics has to anyway accept substantial change and the replacement of one organism by another where there appears to be no death and no corpse has appeared. 
Bad Biology?
Animals popping in and out of existence without noticeable biological changes appear to be bad biology. The animalist will protest that if human people are identical to human animals as the hylomorphic theorist admits, then they wouldn't move with the cerebrum if the same animal that once had a brain is still in the original operating room in a brainless state. Animalists insist that functioning cerebra are not needed for an animal to persist. Human embryos existed early in their lives without cerebra and older humans in permanent vegetative states have non-functioning and liquefying cerebrums. So it might seem that no human animal has gone out of existence with the removal of its cerebrum in the thought experiment. Moreover, there is no denying that after the removal of the cerebrum for transplant that there is a living cerebrumless animal in the operating room. It would seem that if the hylomorphic theorist claims that the post-transplant cerebrumless animal is not identical to the human being with a cerebrum that was brought into the operating room prior to the surgical procedure, then there has come into existence a new human animal, merely as a result of cerebrum removal! How, asks the amazed animalist, can the hylomorphic thinker accept that a new animal has popped into existence when there hasn't been any noticeable change in life processes during the operation? It certainly doesn't appear that an organism died on the operating table and a new animal took the place of the deceased. Furthermore, since the hylomorphic theorist maintains that the human being has moved with its cerebrum, placing that cerebrum into a mindless animal body will bring about the demise of the animal and its replacement by the human animal that the transplanted human being was identical to. The animalist protests that placing a cerebrum in a cerebrumless entity can no more bring about the 11 replacement of one animal with another than can the transplant of a liver. 7 Claims to the contrary are just bad biology.
The hylomorphic tradition has the resources to take much of the sting off the animalist's charge that no animal would have replaced another when the former's cerebrum is removed and that no animal will go out of existence when the functioning cerebrum of another is placed in its skull. It is important for Christian readers to keep in mind their commitment to our being distinct in creation. We are told in Genesis that we are made in God's image. Aquinas rejects the claim that "the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind" Instead, he claims "….man is the most perfectly like God according to that which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature." 8 We are the only rational, self-conscious, free and morally responsible animals. These capacities distinguish us from all other living creatures. If such capacities are granted to have ontological significance rather than just conceived as contingent features of us, then if the matter that composes something with such capacities later composes something without these capacities, none of us would be identical to the resulting entity. So it is not as bizarre for the Christian metaphysician to posit in the cerebrum transplant thought experiment that most of the matter that had composed us moments before our cerebrum's removal, afterwards ceases to do so since the soul that makes our unique mental capacities possible no longer configures that matter. The resulting body composed of the matter that used to be configured by our soul won't even have dormant or stymied mental capacities for they have gone with the transplanted cerebrum. 
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Advocates of hylomorphism might make some odd biological claims but they don't have to claim that we go out of existence when consciousness is irreversibly lost due to stroke or injury as do the psychological accounts of identity that claim we are essentially thinking beings. The "common sense" view is that someone goes with their transplanted (operational) cerebrum but would stay alive in their original body as a mindless animal if their cerebrum is destroyed in say a stroke. My informal polls of students has discovered that they want to say that Grandma stays behind in the vegetative state when her cerebrum is destroyed by a stroke, but that if it were possible to transplant someone's functioning cerebrum then that person would be found wherever his working cerebrum was. The animalist says we can't have it both ways since the cerebrumless body and the body with the destroyed cerebrum are functionally equivalent from a biological point of view. But Mark Spencer argues that the hylomorphist can indeed have it both ways, preserving both common sense intuitions. 9 Spencer suggests that the hylomorphist should see the soul going with the cerebrum rather than staying behind in the comatose or cerebrumless animal. His point is the hylormorphic soul strives to realize its highest powers. So if it has a chance to manifest its rationality, then it will. Since it can't realize its rationality in a cerebrumless body, it will go with the transplant. If the cerebrum is destroyed rather than transplanted, the soul will stay in the body realizing its vegetative powers rather than depart and bodily death ensue. over from sensations, their production dependent upon material organs. The soul needs phantasms produced by organs. It can't generate them. But a soul in Purgatory is capable of thought only because God provides a substitute for the phantasms. 11 Thus the soul is not a self-sufficient thinker. But why does that help with the problem of too many thinkers? If the soul is the subject of thought, though with God providing a substitute for the phantasms, why couldn't the earlier soul think with the brain providing the phantasms? Aquinas seems to imply as much as he says "The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding by turning to corporeal phantasms; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper of other separated substances." 12 Toner thinks this quote provides the solution to the problem of too many thinkers while I think it gives rise to the problem. My view is that the passage merely shows that the anti-mortem soul thinks in a different but analogous manner to the posthumous soul. What is needed for a solution is an account of how embodiment keeps the soul from thinking, rendering it merely a non-thinking contributor to the person's thought, roughly akin to the way the materialist understands neurons to contribute to the production of thought without themselves thinking such thoughts.
If it were the case that the soul merely contributes to thought but is incapable of being a subject of thought, then the deceased person would have to be there in Purgatory for thought to occur -just as Eberl conjectures. It follows that the human being is in violates the necessity of identity is that it posits that one is identical to one's body (composed of soul and matter) and then exists later in Purgatory without the body.
It might seem that these problems can be avoided by an appeal to constitution in which the living person is constituted rather than identical to his body, and then the 14 Constitutional Hylomorphism violates the constitution principle that if x constitutes y at t, it is possible that: x exists without being linked to anything of the kind that y is at t (i.e., the lump could exist without constituting the statue at t; but the statue doesn't constitute the lump because it couldn't exist without a lump at t). Can this be avoided? I suspect it can't, nonetheless, I will try to sketch an approach others can perhaps improve upon. If successful, it will offer an advantage over animalism in its treatment of Unger's problem of the thinking many and Olson's problem of the thinking brain, the latter which Olson acknowledged as the most troubling aspect of his animalism. 17 The hylomorphic account denies thought to the brain or any organ.
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The thought is made possible by a soul whose powers transcend its material organs. It would be a mistake to understand the soul apart from the body doing such thinking. To do so is to think of the soul as having a part that doesn't configure any material part of the organism and that this non-configuring immaterial part is doing the abstract thinking.
This will lead one to think of the soul as a subject of thought, rather than merely contributing to the human being's thinking. Moreover, if we think of the soul as an extended simple, 19 then it won't even be correct to say that the brain plus the soul that thinks, or the head plus the soul that thinks. To do so is to either abstract away from the soul's configuration of the human being or to again treat the soul as if it had parts, one part pairing with the head, another (overlapping) part with the brain. Rather, the extended, simple (partless) soul configures the rest of the body so it enables the entire human being alone to think. 
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human body that it configures renders the human being capable of thought. When the soul is detached, the bestowed or absorbed powers making the human being the subject of thought then drain or flow back and are manifested by the soul alone.
Does this work? I doubt it. It is hard to think of an analogy or helpful comparison to illustrate our metaphors. Why should the soul's powers to be the subject of thought be absorbed by the configured animal but flow back into the soul when it is disembodied? In fact, it is easier to envision an analogy to the contrary. If a brain in a vat can think, then why would attaching it to a body prevent its thinking? It will come to use the body's sense organs rather than receive inputs from the vat machinery, but it will think in both scenarios. The artificial vat inputs are akin to the divinely bestowed 'participated species' while the products of the sense organs are like the phantasms.
It is no help to appeal to thought being maximal for that seems to me to be just a desperate attempt to linguistically stipulate away a substantial metaphysical problem.
One could turn to God to bestow missing powers on the detached soul when before it merely contributed to thought? However, one problem would seem that the soul belongs ontologically to the wrong category of thing to be a thinker. Forms seem more on the property side of the substance/property divide. But interpreting the soul more substantially, the acquisition of the capacity to be a subject of thought flirts with substantial change in a hylomorphic metaphysics. It may be that some object that doesn't have the natural potential to think can't ever acquire it, rather it must be replaced by an object that can. The traditional succession of souls theory doesn't bestow new cognitive powers on an earlier soul without them. Of course, the rational embodied soul is not previously uninvolved with thought, but its being the subject of thought is akin to some neurons that contributed to thought suddenly becoming thinkers of those thoughts.
Perhaps the best thing for the Thomist to do is to accept that we think derivatively in virtue of our soul strictly or nonderivatively thinking. If some form of Noonan-style pronoun revisionism is accepted, it will take some of the sting off the too many thinkers problem and perhaps avoid the earlier mentioned epistemic and duplication problems.
On this account, the first person pronoun "I" doesn't automatically refer to all of its thinkers but to the individual with the appropriate persistence conditions. Or if pronoun revisionism is too conventional and thus suspect as a linguistic quick fix to a substantial metaphysical problem, the inability of the soul to refer in the manner characteristic of the essential indexical can be built into the soul's nature. One, perhaps tolerable, problem with this solution is that it runs afoul of the sentiments so aptly expressed by Chisholm:
"If there are two things that now hope for rain; the one doing the so on its own and the other such that its hoping for rain is now done by the thing that happens to constitute it, then I'm the former and not the latter." So there will be people alive when Jesus returns and they, we assume, will need to undergo the process of purgation. Since even the hylomorphist is going to be committed to some people apparently experiencing Purgatory embodied, it doesn't seem an implausible conjecture that all of us do so. But this runs afoul of tradition that deems Purgatory for most people to be prior to resurrection and legitimate recipients of prayer, the saintly even influential.
Given the earlier mentioned considerations of fairness and a problem of thinking parts, it won't help the animalist if it is just your cerebrum in Purgatory. God's actions will appear a lot less objectionable if we imagine that the alternative to taking and replacing the body, assuming the Olson/van Inwagen metaphysics where there must be the immanent causation of the organism's previous states and life processes causing its later states and life processes. There would not be any remains of the dead to be viewed by the survivors. A benevolent God would wants us to know that our loved ones (and others) have died and have not just gone missing. That is one thing that the corpse or a replacement corpse does. In its absence, without the socalled deception, we would be left wondering whether our loved ones were still alive and in need of our help. It wouldn't even help for God to have inscribed in Scripture that bodies would be taken upon death for we still won't know whether someone was dead and bereavement should begin or if they had gone missing. 24 While the reassembly account of resurrection would allow people's remains to now decay in the grave, if there are people presently in Purgatory, parts of their remains must now be missing. 
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So it is for the best that God replaces the bodies of the deceased with duplicates.
But someone might say that just makes it a benevolent deception for the knowledge that someone is dead will be inferred from God causing a fallacious perceptual belief. So God brings about a good state through deceptive means since people have inferred their belief about the deceased from perceiving their motionless body. However, while it is likely that people will reason via a false belief about someone's actual corpse being in view, that doesn't have to be God's intention. He merely intends for people to believe someone is dead (rather than missing and in need etc). He need not intend that they have the false belief that they see actual remains. He wouldn't stop people from acquiring Olson or van
Inwagen's metaphysics. It is our metaphysical obtuseness, not God's deception that keeps us from the truth. And this failure of God to reveal his motives is not that different from many other such occasions that give apologists their work It may even be the case that very few people ever are remotely caused by God to have a perceptual error for it might be that God only takes and replaces parts of the brain that are not visible to anyone viewing the body unless they were a coroner or a doctor etc.
So very few people would have false beliefs, hence the alleged deception would not be 'systematic'. Now one might wonder why would God create a duplicate brain if the rest of the body was there to inform us to begin mourning -and to facilitate grieving by providing a physical link to the deceased. Well, God could very well have good reason to create the replica for doctors, coroners and med students who need to determine the cause of death or learn some anatomy. So God could at most be accused of permitting a widespread false belief that the deceased have the remains of their brain ensconced within their skull. Anyway, my point is that we can give a defense, which for all we know 27 is true, that avoids divine deception and is morally quite preferable to the alternatives, given the constraints of the Olson's van Inwagen-inspired metaphysics.
VII. Scorekeeping
As I said at the outset, the comparison would be incomplete and thus inconclusive. Even on the three issues discussed, I suspect different readers will balance the reasons differently. My hope is that I have put more considerations on the scales than were there before and removed some that shouldn't have been so placed.
